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ROADSIDE SOBRIETY TEST - DETENTION - CHARTER RIGHTS 
Regina v . BONOGOFSKI - B.C. Court of Appeal -
CA 007055 , November 18, 1987 
The accused used three lanes of traffic to drive in one direction and, when 
turning left, he drove over top of a cement divider. From that driving, and 
the results of the breath tests, it seems safe to say that the accused was 
quite intoxicated. However, an infringement of the accused's right to counsel 
superseded and suppressed this fact when the conviction of impaired driving 
was appealed. 
The officer, who witnessed the above described driving, decided, despite the 
atrocious driving and the accused's stumbling when alighting from his car 
(along with all other typical symptoms of intoxication), that some sobriety 
tests were in order . Upon completion of those tests, the officer seemed not 
to have effected an arrest, but made the demand. He gave the accused his 
Charter goodies and took him in for the breath tests. 
Defence counsel argued that the accused was detained from the moment he was 
stopped and the officer saw his condition. However, the officer had not made 
the accused aware of his rights until he had collected more incriminating 
evidence. He admitted on the stand to be fully aware of the weightiness of 
sobriety test results in impaired driving case. As a matter of fact, the 
defence claimed that without the evidence of the test, the conviction for 
impaired driving would not likely have resulted. 
The B.C. Court of Appeal agreed that the accused was detained from the moment 
he was stopped and that he should have been informed of his right to counsel 
at that point. Waiting until after the sobriety test was an infringement of 
the accused's Charter right. The question if all of the evidence should be 
excluded hinged on whether the officer had acted in good faith. After all, 
the B.C. Court of Appeal has emphasized (especially in the Gladstone case*) 
that good faith on the part of the police is an important, if not a decisive 
factor. Also, that when police comply with the law as it was at the time, 
they acted in good faith despite precedents that since may have made their 
actions contrary to the law. Nevertheless the B.C. Court of Appeal decided 
unanimously: 
* 
" but, in this case, I think that 
the finding of a good faith should not 
be the determining factor. Cst. M. 
believed, erroneously, that prior to 
the physical tests he was not 
detaining Bonogofski. In view of Cst. 
M's knowledge of the importance of the 
Issues of Interest , Volume 22, page 22 
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physical tests in deciding whether to 
make a demand on Bonogofski, I think 
that he should have given him the 
warning under s. lO(C) of the 
Charter." 
The evidence was consequently held to be inadmissible. 
Accused's appeal granted 
Conviction set aside 
Acquittal substituted 
Note: The B. C. Court of Appeal made some comments that may be of interest. 
The Court said that not every driver who stops for police should be considered 
to be detained. For instance, stopping a person to make hirnfher aware of a 
dangerous road condition does not constitute detention. That is where the 
Court's comment stopped and it did not address the question of detention, when 
a person is stopped for any kind of infraction of the law. Traffic violations 
come to mind . It s<..e::-.s irr:po::::.:::-.: to remember that so far there has been no 
suggestion, in any cases, that detention only occurs when the officer in the 
circumstances, has the po~er to effect an arrest. Yet, this is a popular 
belief in the law enforcement community . Detention is included in arrest , but 
the cases say that there can be detention without arrest and do not ~ to 
say that power to arrest in the circumstances is a prerequisite to detention . 
* * * * * 
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DISCLOSURE AND DISCOVERY - ACCUSED ENTITLED 
TO AMPOULE OF ALCOHOL SOUJTION - S. 7 OF THE CHARTER 
R. v. HOI.11, County Court of Kootenay -
Fernie No. 430059, August 1987 
Three months prior to the accused's trial for "over 80 mg" and impaired 
driving, defence counsel wrote to the prosecutor and demanded, " ... I require a 
sample of the breath test solution that was identified in the Certificate. I 
need that for testing by my own expert." Two months later, the prosecutor 
responded, "I am not prepared to give you a sample of the breath solution -
nor the alcohol solution identified in the certificate - as there can be no 
use in having it tested. It would not be the one employed on the occasion, so 
any inaccuracy (even if there were one) would only be speculative." When the 
Crown appealed the accused's acquittal for "over 80 mg." defence counsel 
submitted (as he did at trail) that the prosecutor's refusal to give him the 
required samples, amounted to an infringement of the accused's right under s. 
7 of the charter,* and had appropriately caused the certificate evidence to be 
excluded at trial. 
The County Court Judge, who heard the appeal, agreed with the defence and 
ruled that refusal to supply a representative ampoule of the alcohol standard 
solution had infringed the accused's constitutional right. He quoted from 
other precedent setting judgements about the meaning of s.7 of the Charter. 
It is incredibly broad and includes pre-trial disclosures and discovery 
rights. In this case, the accused had the right to a sample ampoule to test 
its suitability. 
This left the question if that infringement should and could result in 
suppressing the certificate evidence. Section 24(2) of the Charter is quite 
specific and only refers to evidence "obtained in a manner that infringed or 
denied any rights or freedoms ... " Here, the infringement played no part in 
obtaining any evidence. The Court found no merit in that submission and the 
appeal judge applied what is known as "the poisonous tree principle" to this 
issue by saying: 
"In my opinion, the 
violation being a denial of 
fundamental justice, the 
whole process is affected 
and not merely the impugned 
evidence." 
He further observed that if violations of s. 7 of the Charter, occurring after 
evidence was obtained, was incapable of triggering consideration for 
exclusion, then s. 24(2) would be meaningless insofar as a denial of 
* BOURGET v. The Queen - Saskatchewan Queen's Bench -
July 1986 (unreported) 
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fundamental justice is concerned. Hence, section 24(2) of the Char ter 
applied. However, would admission of the certificate bring the administration 
of justice into disrepute. Considering the accused was obliged by law to 
provide incriminating evidence, strictness of the application of Charter 
provisions does follow as was recently indicated by the Supreme Court of 
Canada .* 
Crown' s Appeal was dismissed. 
~ot::: !~ •:::..c·.; cf the " f:riYclc'..!::" ar.d "remarkable" response by Crown Counsel 
to defence counsel's request, the accused applied to be compensated for his 
costs. There are ~ow some precedents for such awards if the prosecution or 
appeal are frivolous or for oblique reasons. However, as the County Court 
Judge could not see anything unusual or different in substance from other 
appeals, he did not think this was an appropriate case to set a precedent . 
* 
* * * * * * 
Regina v. THERENS , see Volume 21 , page 1 of this publication 
18 C.C.C . (3d) 481 
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MUST THE PERSON WO REF1JSES TO BLOW BE INFORMED AS 
OF RIGHT OF THE OFFENCE HE COMMITS? 
Regina v. JOHNSTON - Vancouver County Court -
cc 861023 
The accused was given four opportunities to provide the breathsamples demanded 
of him. His failure to provide a suitable sample amounted to refusal and he 
was convicted accordingly. He appealed to the County Court submitting that 
failure on the part of the police officers to tell him that he was committing 
an offence when he failed to provide a suitable sample was an infringement of 
the accused's Charter right. Defence counsel relied heavily on a decision by 
the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal* which held that a refusal is not irrevocable 
and that a suspected impaired driver in circumstances, as in this Johnston 
case, should be advised that non-compliance with the demand constitutes a 
criminal offence. This is particularly so, as the offence is unique in that a 
person on demand of authorities is obliged to provide evidence against 
himself; a practice contrary to the most basic principles of law. 
The County Court Judge did not buy the argument and found an Alberta case** 
more in line with the law. Consistent with that case he found the criminal 
code does not provide for a person under demand to be informed as defence 
counsel suggested and that such a warning is unnecessary. There may well be a 
general policy or courtesy to do so, but Mr. Johnston is presumed to know the 
law "and if he chooses not to comply with the demand he cannot expect legal 
advice from the police, particularly as he has been advised and offered the 
opportunity of contacting legal counsel and seek advice . " 
Accused ' s appeal dismissed 
Conviction upheld 
*JACKIE v. Regina, 26 Saskatchewan Reports, 295 
Saskatchewan Q.B. 
** R. v. HIRANDO 9 m.v.r. (ALTA Q.B . ) 
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CRIKE STOPPERS - SEARCH VAR.RANT ISSUED 
UPON ANONYMOUS INFORMATION - ADKISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE 
Regina v . KYRYIIJK and KYRYIIJK - County Court of Vancouver 
No. CC 860710 - October 1986 
Via anonymous Crime Stopper sources , police were told that marijuana was 
hydroponically grown at a certain address and was being sold from that place . 
Observation of the premises did not reveal activities that supported 
tr~ffi~!~inb. However, the hy~~o bill was excessive and had trippled within 
the last year. Upon the information of the anonymous tip and the trippled 
hydro bill, a Justice of the Peace issued a search warrant. 'What police did 
not tell the Justice of the Peace was that their surveillance had failed to 
produce any evidence of trafficking or any other relevant evidence. This 
should have been included to make full disclosure, argued defence counsel . 
Furthermore, the details contained in the information were inadequate to 
satisfy the Justice of the Peace to issue the warrant added the defence. 
Although the reasons for judg £ment do not say so, it seems that police found 
when they executed the search ~arrant that their anonymous information was 
accurate. The whole judgement is on Charter related issues regarding the 
search being reasonable in the circumstances and whether the evidence found, 
by means of the flawed warrant, should be admitted. 
The County Court Judge opened h i s judgment by outlining the quantum changes 
the Charter had brought to issues of this kind. He acknowledged that, prior 
to the Charter, the issue of legal propriety regarding the warrant was 
collateral, a distant issue that received no consideration at a criminal 
trial. The validity of a search warrant had no bearing on the admissibility 
of what was found by means of the warrant. Hence, an exploration of the 
warrant's validity at trial, used to be a superfluous exercise that would 
only frustrate the trial judge as he had no power to remedy any flaws or 
shortcomings in regards to the warrant. Even having a warrant quashed by way 
of prerogative writ may not have caused the evidence to be inadmissible. 
The Charter, particularly s. 8, has drastically changed all of this. The 
matter of the warrant's validity is no longer collateral, but a kernel issue 
to determine if the search was reasonable. If the Charter right under s . 8 
may have been infringed the evidence is subject to suppression if the 
circumstances don't warrant otherwise and where the administration of justice 
would be brought into disrepute if it were admitted. 
The Court seemed somewhat dubious about Crime Stopper programs. The 
information received via that system ought to be the beginning and not the end 
of an investigation. Furthermore, the results of investigations must be 
revealed to the J'llstice of the Peace, "whether this assists in the granting of 
a warrant or not". In any event, an anonymous tip and a trippled hydro bill 
may raise justified suspicion, but is inadequate to say that the Justice of 
the Peace was satisfied that the officers had reasonable and probable grounds 
- 7 -
to believe that marijuana was being cultivated in that house. The J udge 
concluded that Crime Stoppers needed to be watched closely by the judiciary; 
that the warrant was defective; and that the evidence found must consequently 
be suppressed. Charges were dismissed. 
* * * * * * 
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OBNOXIOUS DETAINEE WHO PROCRASTINATES IN 
CONSULTING COUNSEL - ·CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS 
TREHBLAY and The Queen - Supreme Court of Canada -
October 1987 
The accused was pulled over and a demand for breath samples was made of him . 
He was "violent, vulgar and obnoxious", and obstructed investigation in 
various ways. He procrastinated and delayed things as much as he could. When 
he was given a phone t.o com::.act a lawyer he phoned his wife instead. Although 
it is not too clear, it seems he may have asked his wife to contact a lawyer 
for him. At least he submitted that such was the case and that he was asked 
to blow inunediately upon having phoned his wife. No time was allowed to see 
if a lawyer was going to phone for him. The trial Judge had found that the 
accused's right to counsel had not been infringed and he was convicted of 
"over 80 mg." The County Court reversed that conviction and found there was 
an infringement that called for the exclusion of evidence. Then the Ontario 
Court of Appeal agreed with the trial Judge and restored the conviction. The 
accused took his plit}·.: :c :L S;.;.p:::-e:me Court of Canada. 
Our highest Court held that the accused's rights had been infringed, but for 
such understandable and provoked reasons that admitting the evidence would not 
bring the administration of justice into disrepute. Said the Supreme Court of 
Canada: 
"Generally speaking, if a detainee is 
not being reasonably diligent in the 
exercise of his rights, the 
correlative duties set out in this 
Court's decision in R v. Hanninen* 
imposed on the police in a situation 
where a detainee has requested the 
assistance of counsel are suspended 
and are not a bar to their continuing 
their investigation and calling upon 
him to give a sample of his breath." 
That was not quite the case with the accused. However, his conduct had been 
misleading in terms of retaining and consulting counsel . Such conduct is 
relevant when considering exclusion of the evidence. 
Accused's appeal dismissed 
Conviction was restored. 
* See Volume 28 of the publication, page 1 
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ADMISSIBILITY OF POLYGRAPH - EVIDENCE 
The Queen and BELAND and PHILLIPS 
Supreme Court of Canada, October 1987 
Five men allegedly conspired to rob an armoured truck . One of the 
conspirators went to police and told all. Consequently, no robbery took 
place. The 'drop-out's testimony was the kernel evidence of the Crown's case 
to show the conspiracy it alleged against the accused. The accused also 
testified and they denied everything the Crown had adduced. As a matter of 
fact, they offered to take polygraph tests and submit the results in evidence . 
A motion was made to allow the tests. 
The motion had been denied as the evidence of polygraph tests is inadmissible. 
The accused had this ruling reversed by the Court of Appeal and the Crown 
appealed this reversal to the Supreme Court of Canada. 
Our hi~hest Court, dealt in 1978 with admissibility of a polygraph test 
result in a case where the accused had selected not to testify and attempted 
to put his story to the jury by means of the test. In other words, in that 
case, the results of the polygraph test were to substitute for the accused's 
testimony whereas in this Beland, Phillips case it was asked to be accepted to 
corroborate their own testimony . In that way, the cases were distinct from 
one another. 
In 1962, three men were charged with raping a mentally retarded sixteen year 
old girl. The Crown, being concerned that this girl would not be believed for 
fear of fabrication, called a psychiatrist who said that her low mental age 
lacked the imagination to concoct anything. This was called "oath helping".** 
No evidence is allowed to boost or establish the credibility of witnesses. 
They have to carry the day by themselves in examination-in-chief and cross-
examination. If this sort of evidence was allowed the Courts would become a 
circus with reams of witnesses boosting each other's credibility or to make 
their opponents out as liars. Every witness must assume to be of normal moral 
character. Only when a witness' credibility is impeached "becomes it 
worthwhile to deny that his character is bad". In other words, evidence of 
good character is only allowed to rebut evidence of bad character. 
Beland and Phillips had testified and the requested polygraph evidence was 
solely to bolster their credibility by means of a fallible machine. That 
would fly in the face of the well established rule regarding oath helping. 
This rule is quite consistent with the rule against past consistent 
statements. That is also a form of oath helping. This means calling a a 
person to testify that the witness has made a statement to them consistent 
* PHILLION v. The Queen [1978 ] 1 S.C.R. 18 
** R. v. KYS.ELKA (1962) 133 C.C . C. 103 
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with his/her evidence to bolster the credibility of what is attested to. This 
rule has two applications: 
1. It precludes an accused person from calling a witness to relate a 
statement he (the accused) made and that is self serving. 
2 . . No witness (an accused or not) may call another witness to relate a 
statement he previously made; neither may he testify as to the statements 
he previously made regarding the matter before the Court. 
Allowing that sort of evidence simply means coming in through the back door in 
th.<it- it- fliP.~ i11 t-.hP. fi:icf'. of t-hP hP.;irsay rule. After all, the "oath-aider" 
cannot vouch for the truth of the content of the statement. Furthermore, it 
amounts to an accused person in directly testifying without taking the stand 
and thereby avoiding cross-examination. 
The Supreme Court of Canada saw no difference between what the two accused 
proposed to do and the oath-help rule, or the consistent statement rule . 
"Polygraph evidence when tendered 
would be entirely self-serving and 
would sht:d no light on the real issues 
before the court." 
The court emphasized how the process would become a chaotic "one-up -manship" 
if this was allowed . The only exception to these rules is where there is an 
allegation of recent fabrication, 0r to demonstrate a person's physical, 
emotional or mental condition at a certain time. 
Recognizing that polygraph evidence should no t be rejected because it is not 
perfect , the Supreme Court ruled that it would not possibly serve any purpose. 
It will only -
" disrupt proceedings, cause 
delays, and lead to numerous 
complications which will result in no 
greater degree of certainty in the 
process than that which already 
exists." 
Furthermore, the trial complexities that would result are enormous . Through 
the mouth of a polygraph operator, the trier of fact gets to hear that the 
witness was probably truthful. Such evidence, of course, will only be adduced 
when the accused can find an operator who is willing to so testify. Absence 
of polygraph evidence would eventually lead to witnesses not having 
credibility unless there is someone or something, who or which, is willing to 
attest to their veracity . 
Crown's Appeal allowed 
Conviction confirmed 
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CONVICTION ON FINGERPRINT ALONE - OBTAINING 
PRINT BY MEANS OF SUBSEQUENT ARREST 
- UNREASONABLE SEARCH - UNIAYFUL ARREST 
Regina v. SCHWAB - Vancouver County Court -
No. CC 870443 - September 1987 
A silent alarm took police in early morning hours to a warehouse where about 
$15,000 worth of electronic equipment was stolen during a break-in. A 
fir.gcrprint was four.d ct th8 p~int of entry. It could not be matched with any 
prints on file. 
Approximately eight months later , acting on information that gave the officers 
reasonable and probable grounds, they attended at the accused's home and 
arrested him. His fingerprints, taken upon arrest, matched those found at the 
scene of the break-in. 
All police had was a name given to them by an informer. That does not satisfy 
the prerequisite to a lawful arrest, argued defence counsel. Therefore, the 
taking of the accused's prints was an unreasonable search under the Charter . 
The defence implied that the arrest had been a concoction to obtain his 
fingerprints. 
The Court held that the officer had testified that he had reasonable and 
probable grounds to effect the arrest. This was left unchallenged in cross-
exarnination (perhaps defence counsel feared the answers he would get), and, 
therefore, the unfounded submission of unlawful arrest and unreasonable search 
could not have any weight to rebut the officer ' s testimony. 
The accused was convicted . 
Note: The reasons for judgement do not reveal what the information was about 
or what the arrest was for. It may well have been for an unrelated offence. 
Regarding validity of Identification of Criminals Act and the taking of prints 
prior to conviction, see bottom of page 42 on Supreme Court of Canada decision 
on Dec 17, 1987. 
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THE CI.AIM OF INNOCENCE! 
Regina v. HOK and LEUNG - County Court of Vancouver -
CC 870383 - September, 1987 
An excited man directed by shouts and gestures, two police officers in a 
patrol car to an oriental restaurant. All this took place in early morning 
hours. When the officers arrived three men came out of the restaurant. Two 
ran and were pursued by one officer who apprehended one of the twosome, and 
the thiro man was chased on ioot by the other officer. The latter fugitive 
turned and raised a handgun at the officer who had the presence of mind to 
grab the arm and push it upwards. He overpowered the armed man and arrested 
him. The three men were charged with the armed robbery that had taken place 
just before the police officers arrived. 
There was incredible contrast between the evidence adduced by the defence and 
the Crown. The threesome attempted to persuade the Court that they did not 
know each other, and happened to leave the restaurant at the same time. One 
of theffi even took cr€dit for attempting to apprehend the culprit who had come 
out of the restaurant carrying a handgun. He had seen two men wearing masks 
and carrying a knife. Although he had no idea what was happening, he had 
called out "don't move" to those men. This had start.led them and one of them 
had stumbled and fell. A gun had been dropped by this individual in the 
process. He , the accused, had picked up the gun the very moment police 
arrived. He had then called out to the police "catch them", waving in the 
direction of two fleeing men. When the officer came up to him he had stood 
there innocently with the gun he had just picked up, in hand. It was all a 
terrible misunderstanding and misinterpretation of circumstances, implied the 
accused. 
In terms of the three accused not knowing each other, the Crown rebutted this 
evidence by calling police officers who knew the three and who testified that 
they were in each other's company a short time before the robbery. 
The circumstantial evidence was overwhelming and the two apprehended at the 
scene were convicted. 
The case sets no precedent of any kind, and is only related for the remarkable 
conflict in evidence by the parties to the proceedings . 
* * * * * * 
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IAYFUL AND ARBITRARY ARREST 
Regina v. FAIJLKNER - County Court of Vancouver Island -
Victoria No. 42725, July 1987 
A peace officer may arrest a person if he, on reasonable and probable grounds , 
believes that that person has committed an indictable offence. To arrest a 
person under the Criminal Code for the commission of a summary conviction 
offence, he must find that person committing the offence. In this case, the 
officer arrested the accused for impaired driving at the scene of an accident . 
Hence, he arrested on reasonable and probable grounds. The Crown selected to 
proceed by way of summary conviction. This, argued defence counsel, caused 
the arrest for the hybrid offence of impaired driving to be unlawful. Only if 
the Crown had proceeded by indictment would the arrest have been lawful. The 
trial Judge, as well as the County Court Judge upon appeal, had to make 
defence counsel aware of s. 27 of the Interpretation Act which simply 
stipulates (and has done for decades) that any offence that may be prosecuted 
by indictment is an indictable offence. Due to being a hybrid offence, 
impaired driving rnav be prosecuted by indictment. In other words, regardless 
how it is prosecuted, it remains an indictable offence. This theory also 
validates the photographing and printing of impaired drivers under the 
Identification of Criminals Act. 
Defence counsel also went after the new popular "arbitrary detention" 
infringement due to arrest despite s. 450(2) C.C. The County Cour t Judge· had 
this to say: 
"Time, in obtaining of such evidence 
(breath analyses) is crucial to its 
weight in subsequent proceedings; and 
to let a suspected impaired driver go 
free on an appearance notice where he 
is caught virtually red-handed would 
be a strange proceeding indeed on the 
part of a policeman, a dereliction of 
his duty in my opinion ... " 
The facts in this case (each must be weighted on the merits of the 
circumstances) distinguished it from the ones where the arrests were clearly 
no more than what is now known as "policy arrests". There was a lawful arrest 
in this case and there was no breach of the Charter. 
Accused's Appeal was dismissed 
Conviction for impaired driving upheld 
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Comments : 
Although the officer could in cross-examination not give defence counsel 
chapter and verse as to his authority to arrest the accused, he was quite 
articulate in relating his reasons for doing so. He did concede that he 
always arrests for impaired driving; he felt that an arrest leaves no doubt in 
the .suspect's mind that he/she is to accompany him to give breath samples; 
that it accommodates the giving of the urights" warnings better. He had taken 
the accused from the scene in a downtown area where a crowd gathered that was 
pretty angry over the accident that had jeopardized the safety of the public 
and had caused considerable property damage. Some of these reasons would not 
rPh11t ;:irh:irr;:iry .::i.rrest, l.111i: snrnP oo; particularly the latter was convincing . 
However, the County Court Judge seemed to say that the collecting of the 
evidence (included in the public interest issues summed up ins. 450(2) C. C. ) 
is sufficient to justify the arrest . 
* * * * * * 
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PROSTITUTION IAWS 
ARE THE SECTIONS AMBIGUOUS? 
Regina v . HEAD - B.C. Court of Appeal -
CA 007153 - Vancouver, June 1987 
A policeman was acting as the purchaser of sexual services and arrested the 
accused who looked in his car, and when he stopped offered him sexual services 
for $40. 
The applicable enactment in the Criminal Code is s. 195 . 1(1), which reads as 
follows: 
"Every person who in a public place or 
in any place open to public view 
(a) stops or attempts to stop any 
motor vehicle, 
(b) impedes the free flow of 
pedestrian or vehicular traffic or 
ingress to or egress from premises 
adjacent to that place, or 
(c) stops or attempts to stop any 
person or in any manner communicates 
or attempts to communicate with any 
person 
for the purpose of engaging in 
prostitution or of obtaining the 
sexual services of a prostitute is 
guilty of an offence punishable on 
swnmary conviction." 
The accused was charged under s. 195.l(l)(c) C.C. which the trial Judge held 
was so drafted that, for a conviction, the crown would have to prove something 
in s.s. (a), (b) , and the first half of (c) in addition to a communication 
for the purpose of selling a sexual service. This was all on account of the 
"or's" in the section. Simply because it says "or" in enactment does not mean 
that it refers to an alternative. Often it has a conjunctive meaning. 
Interpreting the section as the trial Judge did would, indeed, lead to 
absurdities. 
Reading the section, one may conclude that communication is essential to all 
the means the section prohibits for offering sexual services. Furthermore, 
does the section outline three or four means by which soliciting can take 
place? The "or" .in s.s. (c) seems to create two distinct means of soliciting 
within that subsection. 
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The Crown appealed the acquittal to the B.C. Court of Appeal. It could not 
see too many problems with s. 195.l (1) C. C. Using the liberal interpretatio~ 
approach the Interpretation Act calls for, there was no need to replace any 
"or" in the section with "and". Although the drafter of the section might 
have done better by adding a s.s . (d) to deal with the communication aspect 
separately, the Court of Appeal found that there was nothing ambiguous about 
the section . 
Crown's appeal allowed. 
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RIGHTS AND LANGUAGE 
Regina v. AUJLA - County Court of Westminster 
No. X018157, July 1987 
The accused was acquitted of impaired driving as he 
English language and had, therefore, not understood 
information police had tried to make him aware of. 
could not understand the 
the 'right to counsel' 
The Crown appealed. 
The tri.al Judge had found that the accused's ability to drive was indeed 
impaired by alcohol at the pertinent time. The acquittal was exclusively as a 
result of the Charter defence of not having understood the right-to-counsel 
awareness information. 
The Crown took the position that where the charge is refusing to give samples 
of breath this Charter defence might be valid. The impairment of the accused 
was blatantly obvious. Therefore, the evidence the trial Judge excluded had 
not at all, in any way, resulted from an infringement of the accused's rights. 
In other words, there was no causal connection, while the exclusionary rule 
(s. 24(2) Charter) states that evidence subject to suppression is that which 
"was obtained in a manner that infringed or denied any rights or freedoms 
guaranteed by this Charter". 
The County Court Judge concluded that the Crown's position was correct, and 
that.there was no connection between the infringement and the evidence and, 
hence, there could not possibly be any disrepute on the administration of 
justice by admitting the evidence of impairment . 
Comments: 
Crown's Appeal allowed 
Evidence to be admitted. 
The appeal judge took the disrepute on the administration of Justice into 
consideration. That seems unnecessary as the lack of the connection between 
the Charter breach and the evidence precludes any consideration for 
suppression of evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter. It seems that 
incredibly absurd situations could arise if that was not so. 
It is also surprising that a similar case by another B.C. County Court Judge* 
was relied on by the defence and was given considerable consideration by this 
County Court Judge. In that similar case, the language barrier had also 
caused the Charter infringement. The evidence of refusal to blow was 
* R. v. Leatherdale - unreported - County Court of Westminster -
January 1985 
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suppressed as was that of the impairment. That Judge had held that it was 
repugnant to exclude the evidence to support one count in an indictment and 
accept it for another count in the same indictment. This, the County Court 
Judge, in this Aujla case, agreed was decided wrongly . 
* * * * * * 
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ARBITRARY DETENTION UPON ACCUSED 
REFUSING TO SIGN APPf.ARANCE NOTICE 
Regina v. GAGNON - County Court of Westminster -
New Westminster Registry X018317, October 1987 
The accused drove erratically and was, apparently, impaired . He was processed 
and, upon completion, was issued an appearance notice in lieu of an arrest. 
The accused refused to sign the appearance notice and he was then handcuffed 
and his "detention" was continued for about 30 minutes until his wife came to 
collect him . This extended detention was spent on a chair in the police 
office . 
The trial Judge found that the accused's right not to be arbitrarily detained 
had been "flagrantly' violated and to remedy this, he stayed the proceedings . 
The Crown appealed. 
The kernel issue in this case is whether the refusal to sign the appearance 
notice justified the continuation of the detention. The officer was satisfied 
that all public interest issues were satisfied and it was clear that the 
refusal to sign the notice did not change this. It was concluded from the 
officer's testimony that he had a personal policy to continue detention or 
custody if a person fails to sign an appearance notice. He felt that, in such 
case (despite the provision ins. 453.2(4) C.C., that an unsigned notice is as 
binding on the person to whom it applies as a signed notice) that either the 
officer-in-charge or the Justice of the Peace should do the releasing. 
The County Court Judge who heard the appeal, held that technically the trial 
Judge was correct. He observed, however, that that Judge's solution "was the 
most sweeping and drastic remedy in the arsenal of remedies" . Said the appeal 
Judge: 
" ... a Charter breach does not in 
itself justify turning the system on 
its head, and while there might be a 
remedy for every Charter breach, it 
does not follow that every breach must 
lead to some remedy being granted at 
trial. The purpose of the trial is, 
as it was before the Charter, to 
decide whether the accused is guilty." 
He further observed that the accused must show that it is more probable than 
not, that the admission of evidence would bring the administration of Justice 
into disrepute. He had not done so. Furthermore, it is not a judicial 
function to discipline police or to remedy police misconduct. Concluded the 
County Court Judge: 
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"It is more likely that given the 
horrors consequent upon impaired 
driving, the conununity would be more 
inclined to accept that the use of s. 
24* on these facts would bring the 
administration of justice into 
disrepute _" 
Crown's appeal allowed 
New trial ordered . 
* Enforcement section of Charter; Remedies to infringements and 
exclusionary rule. 
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ARBITRARY ARREST AND !AWFUL ARREST 
Regina v. CHRISTIENSEN - Vancouver County Court 
CC 870559, September 1987 
The accused was involved in an accident at 1:30 a.m. and was arrested for 
impaired driving despite the fact that none of the npublic interest" 
requisites listed ins. 450 (2) C.C. were apparent. The accused was held in 
cells until 9:00 a.m. He appealed his conviction of "over 80 mg" to the 
County Court. 
One of the grounds of appeal was that the breathalyzer readings should not 
have been allowed in evidence as the accused's right not to be arbitrarily 
arrested or detained had been infringed. 
When the arresting officer was cross-examined on the arrest he said that, due 
to the injuries the accused's wife sustained, the accused had been "uptight" 
and "hyper". The officer also gave as a reason that he had to complete his 
investigation as to the cause of the accident which had not been a collision, 
but a mysterious exiting on the part of the accused's wife while he vehicle 
was being driven along the road. She was "seriously injured". 
When questioned on his "routine" handling of suspected impaired drivers, the 
officer indicated that he always arrested them. He further said, " ... I feel 
the fellow is impaired and he should be arrested for impaired driving." 
Section 450(3) C.C. stipulates that if a peace officer effects an arrest under 
subsection (1) of s. 450 C.C., but should not have done so due to the "public 
interest" provisions ins. 450(2) C.C., he is deemed to be acting "lawfully". 
This County Court Judge held that there is no link between the concepts of 
"lawfully" as used in the Criminal Code, and "arbitrary" as used in the 
Charter. Therefore, a lawful arrest under the Code can still be arbitrary 
under the Charter. He found that the accused's right had been violated and 
that, therefore, the breathalyzer readings should not have been admitted in 
evidence as an "appropriate and just remedy" under s. 24(2) of the Charter. 
Comment: 
Accused's appeal allowed 
Conviction set aside and acquittal 
substituted 
The trial judge who had convicted the accused Christiensen , had relied on a 
1973 decision by the B.C. Court of Appeal* to hold that the officer had acted 
* R. v. HcXibbon - 12 C.C.C (2d) .66 
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lawfully. She had consequently concluded that lawful conduct could hardly be 
contrary to the Charter. As stated above, the appeal court judge disagreed 
with this conclus.ion and observed that in 1973 the Charter was not in effect , 
and that the B.C. Court of Appeal had not been in a position to consider the 
issue in question in this case. 
Both the trial Court and the Appeal Court (County Court) failed to refer to 
the binding precedent set by the B.C. Court of Appeal in September of 1984.* 
In that case, Mr. Mcintosh, the suspected impaired driver, had been arrested 
despite his cooperative attitude and the fact that his wife was standing by to 
d!'ive hirn hoI!!e. Fi.lrthermore, Mr. Mcintosh was kept in cells some hours after 
ne reached sobriety again, according to an expert. Upon appeal, a County 
Court Judge reasoned similarly to the County Court Judge in this Christianson 
case. However, the B.C. Court of Appeal overturned the County Court's 
decision. The only distinctions in the two cases are that in the Mcintosh 
case the County Court acquitted as a remedy under subsection (1) of s. 24 of 
the Charter, while, in this Christianson case, the certificate was excluded 
under subsection (2) of that section, and that in the Mcintosh case the 
officer has been very articulate in stating his reasons for arresting and 
continuing the custody of Mr . Mcintosh. He had testified it was likely that 
impaired persons would re.tur;~ :o th.:ir cars and drive again; ... a person needs 
to be sober to understand the documents by means of which he is 
released; ... "I don't know what he would have done. I would not take that 
chance." ... These reasons, the County Court Judge held, were "mere 
speculation". The B.C. Court of Appeal disagreed totally, and said that the 
County Court had erred in la~ . Experience with impaired drivers, who drive 
again, does amount to grounds for believing the public interest is not 
satisfied. Whether, in statistical terms, the risk is small, is of no 
consequence in showing that there were no grounds for the arrest and custody . 
"The serious consequences which might have ensued" were of prime public 
concern and interest. 
In regards to the Charter argument, and whether or not the officer was 
justified in what he did, the B.C. Court of Appeal said: 
"The Constable was carrying out his 
clear duty in insuring that such 
disaster could not occur. The 
Charter, in protecting individual 
rights, does not require that public 
interest be neglected." 
Admittedly, the officer in the 1984 case was far more explicit in articulating 
why he arrested impaired drivers. Secondly, the car of his suspect was 
available while the Christiensen vehicle was impounded for investigative 
purposes to discover, one supposes, how his wife got to exit the car while it 
was in motion. This could have given rise to argue that the cases were 
* Regina v. Hclntosh - B.C.A.A. 002074, Vancouver 1984 
Volume 18, Page 19 of this publication 
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factually distinct. However , it seems the County Court Judge, in this 
Christiensen case, had the 1984 decision as a threshold. It was relevant and 
similar. Seemingly, he, nor the trial judge, were aware of the precedent 
which was binding on them. 
Another matter that needs to be considered is whether it was the constable ' s 
stat'ement, "I always arrest suspected impaired drivers" that made the 
Christiensen arrest arbitrary in the view of the County Court Judge, or did 
the Judge say that any lawful arrest, effected inconsistently with s. 450(2) 
C.C., constitutes an arbitrary arrest. The reasons for judgment do not, in my 
view, indicate this clearly, though the latter is implied. If that is so, the 
section may be paralyzed in respect to its object. The section is obviously 
protective in nature. If a peace officer is obstructed or assaulted by the 
person he arrests, or a third party, then, whether or not the arrest was in 
compliance withs. 450(2), the officer was in the lawful performance of 
his/her duty for the purposes of "any proceedings under this or any other Act 
of Parliament". If any inconsistency withs. 450(2) C.C. creates arbitrary 
arrest, then the exclusionary rule effectively paralyzes this subsection. 
Furthermore, if the County Court Judge is corr~ct he, in essence, considers 
the subsection to be without force or effect, except for one still 
undetermined issue . To have your rights and freedoms infringed can, 
particularly in criminal matters, be a windfall benefit. 'Whether these 
benefits are transferable, has not yet been decided. For instance, if an 
arrest is effected, and a third party obstructs the officer, could that third 
party benefit from the fact that the arrest was lawful, but contrary to the 
Char~er? If the answer is "No", thens. 450(2) C.C. still may meet its object 
in those circumstances. 
* * * * * * 
Since writing the above, the B. C. Court of Appeal decided again on a near 
identical case and obviously had not changed its views since 1984.* In 
October of this year the B.C . Court of Appeal rendered judgement on an appeal 
by Mr. Kearns, who was stopped for speeding and promptly arrested for impaired 
driving when the officer observed the relevant symptoms. At the police 
station, Mr. Kearns inquired if it was policy to keep suspected impaired 
drivers who fail to give samples of their breath, overnight. This was 
confirmed. Mr. Kearns is a personal friend of an officer who was stationed at 
the detachment and in consultation with him, this policy was confirmed. Mr . 
Kearns then gave samples of his breath and was released on an appearance 
notice. He was convicted of "over 80 mlg" and had failed to persuade the 
* Regina v. Kearns - CA 006880 -
Vancouver, October 1987 
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trial judge and a County Court Judge on appeal, that the certificate of 
analysis should be excluded as his rights had been infringed due to arbitrary 
detention. He also argued that, due to the threat of continued custody, he 
had given the breath samples involuntarily . The latter ground for appeal was 
quickly disposed of. Voluntariness is not an issue after a demand has been 
made. 
On the issue of arbitrary detention; whether or not the arrest had been 
contrary to s. 450(2) C.C . ; and the connection between the two, as well as 
police behaviour in this case, the B.C. Court of Appeal had the following to 
say: 
#Even if these had been found to be a 
threatened arbitrary detention, that 
did not remove the appellant's liberty 
under s. 7 of the Charter." 
The Court of Appeal did not interfere with the findings of the "Courts belov;" 
that the arrest was not arbitrary; held that police had acted honourable and 
reasonably; that any causal connection between-any Charter infringement 
(threat of continued detention that would be arbitrary), and the obtaining of 
the evidence (the breatb sam}'les) was "tenuous and unsubstantial". 'Whether 
the cumulative effect of the arrest and the threat of continued custody amount 
to arbitrary detention, the B.C. Court of Appeal said: 
"In my viev.·, in the circumstances 
which I hav.:: related, this is a 
tenuous argument and, in my opinion, 
devoid of reality." 
"The arguments submitted to us are 
theoretical in nature and mere 
conjecture in the face of irreversible 
findings of facts. They must be 
rejected in their entirety." 
Needless to say, Kearns appeal was dismissed. 
'Whether this view would withstand the Supreme Court of Canada's trend on these 
issues is a matter of nail-biting suspense. In any event, in the meantime, 
the views of the County Court Judge in the Christianson case do not seem to 
reflect the binding precedents in B.C. 
A case that is distinct in circumstances from the Christiensen case, but is 
interesting in terms of lawful arrest and arbitrary detention, is The Queen 
and Lee, Supreme Court of British Columbia, Vancouver No. 51-56 - 07100, July 
1987. 
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In this case, a constable who had reasonable and probable grounds that the 
registered owner of a motor vehicle (which had sheared off a powerpole and 
later been driven into the bushes) had been driving while his ability to do so 
was impaired by alcohol, had gone to the owner's home and found him laying on 
his bed suffering from substantial facial lacerations. He arrested the man 
(the accused) for driving while impaired, but did not tell him of his right to 
coun.sel. The officer's primary concern seemed to have been to get medical 
treatment for the accused. When that treatment had been rendered at the local 
hospital, the officer made a demand for breath samples, and then told the 
accused of his right to counsel. 
At trial, much was made of the arrest. It came out that the officer knew the 
accused for some time as a person who was residing in the community the 
officer policed. It seems reasonable to say that the defence established that 
the officer had no grounds to believe that the accused could not be located, 
would not respond to a document compelling his appearance in Court, or would 
commit an offence . In terms of gathering the available evidence, the demand 
without the arrest would have sufficed. Hence, it was concluded that the 
arrest was lawful, albeit contrary to section 450 C.C. which dictates that in 
the absence of such belief , a peace officer shall not arrest. 
It should be noted that the defence did show absence of the requisite beliefs 
the officer should have had to make the warrantless arrest in compliance with 
s. 450 C.C. However, it did not question why the arrest was effected. To 
make the arrest arbitrary, it may have assisted the defence if the arrest was 
made routinely, or in compliance with policy . This left the Court with the 
question, if any arrest made contrary to that special provision ins. 450 C.C . 
(or any unlawful arrest for that matter) constitutes an arbitrary detention or 
imprisorunent as mentioned in s. 9 of the Charter. 
The trial judge had answered the question in the affirmative, and had remedied 
this infringement of the accused's right not to be so detained by staying the 
proceedings against him. The Crown appealed this decision to the Supreme 
Court of B.C . 
The defence, in this case, had not pursued all issues of public interest 
listed ins. 450 C.C . The important question, however, is, if in the case of 
warrantless arrest, the burden of proof is on the Crown to show compliance 
with s. 450 C.C. (Generally, the burden of proof to show an infringement of a 
right of freedom is on the party to the proceedings who alleges such 
infringement). 
With seeming reluctance, the Supreme Court Justice found that the burden to 
prove that the warrantless arrest was in compliance with s. 450(2) C.C. is 
upon the Crown. Despite the inadequate pursuit of this issue at trial he held 
that "as a matter of law" he could not find that the trial judge had erred in 
finding a "non-observance" of s. 450 on the part of the arresting officer. 
This brought the Justice to the kernel question whether all warrantless 
arrests, which "shall" not be effected where no reasonable grounds for 
believing that they are necessary in view of "public interest" are ipso facto 
an infringement of the arrested person's right not to be arbitrarily detained. 
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The Justice found that "arbitrary detention" i s "something more than arrest 
not within the strict requirements of s. 450". If the framers of the Charter 
had wanted to include all arrests not legally justified, in detentions that 
infringe a Charter right or freedom, it would have said so. Consequently. he 
found that not all uniustified arrests are arbitrary or an infringement of a 
Chal."ter right. 
In the Justice's opinion, the lawful, but unjustified arrest made in this case 
was not "despotic or capricious". It seemed to have been made predominantly 
to get the accused the medical attention he so obviously needed. He had 
refused to attend hospital, and the arrest at least got him there. This may 
not have justified the arrest from a strict legal viewpoint, but it seems that 
if this was the decent and humanitary reason for the arrest, it may not· amoun:. 
to an infringement of a right. Even if it did amount to such an infringement 
it may not require any remedy under s . 24 of the Charter. In other words, the 
stay of proceedings would be overkill. 
As all of this had not been considered and decided upon, the Supreme Court 
Justice allowed the Crown's appeal, and held that as there was an absence of 
any malice- or mistreatment of the accused, or of his right to make a full 
answer and defence, the further prosecution of the accused would not place the 
administration of justice in an unfavourable light. 
Continuance of Trial was Ordered. 
* * * * * * 
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KANNER.ISM OF SF.ARCHING PERSON llITIIOUT ARREST -
NARCOTICS CONTROL ACT 
Regina v. O'Reilly - County Court of Prince Rupert -
No . 9954 T, July 1987 
A police officer received information that a young man was smoking marijuana 
in a parking lot. As the officer approached the group of youths, he could 
smell the marijuana smoke and he saw a container protruding from the accused ' s 
pocket. Believing that all this gave him reasonable and probable grounds to 
search, the officer went through the accused's pockets and found the container 
to hold the suspected contraband. The Provincial Court trial judge considered 
the search, in the circwnstances, unreasonable, and due to the consequential 
exclusion of the evidence, he acquitted the accused of the charge of 
possessing marijuana. The Crown appealed this decision. 
It should be noted that the legitimacy of the search exclusively depended on 
the information the officer had, and the smell that assisted to confirm the 
accuracy of that information. There was no arrest, and the search was not 
based on the provisions of the Judges' Golden Rules which, at common law, 
justify a search for evidence or anything with which the accused may harm 
anyone, including himself, or may make good his escape. The trial judge had 
held that, in the circumstances, the authority to search had been derived from 
the detention imposed on the accused by the manner in which the search was 
conducted (hands in the air and the constable padding and emptying pockets) . 
The trial judge implied that, had the constable told the accused of his 
grounds, and had asked him to empty his pockets, that would have been 
reasonable, and such a search would have been under s. 10 of the Narcotic 
Control Act. Despite the fact that the officer did not effect an arrest, and 
issued an appearance notice (in lieu of an arrest), the trial judge had held 
that the manner of searching had, technically, amounted to an arrest. The 
manner of search conducted would only have been necessary had the accused been 
uncooperative. 
The County Court Judge disagreed quite sharply with the trial judge. He held 
that there is no law, and there ought to be no precedent to say that a search 
is only reasonable after a person has been given an opportunity to surrender 
the contraband to be searched for voluntarily. Secondly, the binding 
precedents for B.C. are that, as long as there is a nexus or connection 
between the place where the search is conducted, the person searched and the 
narcotic, a person's search without arrest under s. 10 N.C.A. is lawful. This 
was to defeat the argwnent that the section gave such broad authorization 
that, if one person in a stadium where thousands were gathered for an event 
had narcotics in his/her possession, any or all of those gathered could be 
searched. The "nexus or connection" requirement effectively prevents any 
arbitrary exercise of police power. 
Crown's Appeal Allowed - New Trial 
ordered. 
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CONSTITUTIONALITY OF GUILT IN CARNAL KNOYLEDGE OF 
A FEMALE PER.SON UNDER FOURTEEN YEARS, DESPITE SINCERE 
BELIEF OF AGE (s. 146(1) C.C.) 
Regina v. Ferguson - B.C. Court of Appeal -
Vancouver CA 003488, September 1987 
The 17 year old accused had sexual intercourse with an eleven year old girl . 
The accused "honestly, but mistakenly believed" the girl was sixteen years of 
age. Despite this belief, he was convicted of having sexual intercourse with 
a female person under the age of fourteen . He appealed, arguing that an 
honest, ~ut reisteken belief that the girl was older than fourteen years 
effectively erased mens rea as an element of this outright criminal offence. 
It is a principle of fundamental justice that intent is an element of a 
criminal act. Therefore , section 146(1) C.C. is unconstitutional, and its 
provision that an honest belief is no defence is not "demonstrably justified 
in a free and democratic society". (Sections 7 and 1 of the Charter 
respectively). 
The B.C . Court of Appeal gave an interesting overview of the history of the 
offence which goes back to 1275 and was then known as "ravishing a maiden". 
In the middle ages a death penalty was provided by statute, but even for that 
period, history does not record that the honest belief of being above 
statutable age was ever raised until 1875* when such "connection" with a girl 
under the age of sixteen was a crime contrary to the "Offenses Against the 
Person Act" of 1861. The British Courts held that, when a man "connected" 
with a child, relying on her consent, he did so "at his peril", if she 
happened to be under age. The British Parliament included this provision in 
their statute in 1885, and so did Canada in 1892. It has been there ever 
since by means of various wordings. Currently, New Zealand and Australia , as 
well as most of the U.S. states, have this provision in their criminal law. 
Overhauls of the sex crimes were brought about due to pressure groups and a 
realization that some of those laws were indeed inconsistent with the ways of 
contemporary society. In Canada, there were quantum changes in 1978, and 
again in 1983 . However, s . 246(1) C. C. remained unamended despite the strong 
recommendations by the Law Reform Committee in 1978 to neuter the section and 
to make due diligence to discover the girl's age a defence. Obviously, 
Parliament wished the provision to remain unaltered. However, Parliamentary 
supremacy is, since 1982, (inclusion of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms in 
the Constitution Act) considerably less potent where legislation by our 
elected representatives infringes a guaranteed right or freedom. In other 
words, if the provision that effectively removes !!!.fill§.~ from the offence 
created by s. 146(1) is inconsistent with the provision ins. 7 of the Charter 
(we cannot be deprived of our liberty except in accordance with the principles 
of fundamental justice) and, if that portion of the section that offends the 
Charter cannot withstand the test, described ins. 1 of the Charter (if the 
provision is demonstrably justified), then the Courts must declare that part 
of the section to be without force or effect (s. 52(1) Charter) . 
* R. v. Prince - L.R . 2C.C.R . 154 
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The Supreme Court of Canada interpreted the meaning of s.l of the Charter in 
1986*. A simplified version of their decision is that the Courts must be 
guided by the values and principles of our free and democratic society. If 
restrictions on the rights or freedoms guaranteed in the Charter are 
essential, or even reasonably necessary to preserve those values, then they 
are justified. Reviewing the devastating consequences (exploitation, 
prostitution, abortions, psychological, economic and family consequences) of 
men having sexual intercourse with a female child, the B.C. Court of Appeal, 
in essence, said that the evil of the infringement of a constitutional right 
ins. 146(1) C.C., is justified by the greater evil flowing from the 
unscrupulous ones among us who will take advantage of and/or outright exploit 
female children at their most vulnerable age. Not being blind to the fact 
that some young females do initiate the sexual acts, and can be very 
persuasive and seductive, the Court agreed with Courts of other nations which 
held that provisions, as found ins. 146 (1) C.C., are there to protect young 
females even from themselves. 
In terms of the consequences of striking the offending words ins. 146(1) C. C. 
that effectively remove mens rea in respect to knowledge of the girl's age, 
the Court found that the Crown would then have to prove that the accused knew 
the age of the girl. The Court implied that, other than in cases where the 
age is obvious or where by means of a subjective test that knowledge can be 
proved, the section would be a legislative tiger with very serious dental 
problems. Hence, there is a rational connection between the elimination of 
the mens !:fil! as to the girl's age as an element of the crime, and the 
protection Parliament intends to provide. 
Based on all these, and various technical reasons, the B.C. Court of Appeal 
held that the limitation of personal liberty in s. 146(1) C.C. is reasonable 
and demonstrably justified . 
Note: 
Appeal dismissed - Crown 
Conviction Upheld. 
This B.C. Court of Appeal decision was not unanimous. One of the three 
Justices dissented and would have allowed the appeal. This lack of unanimity 
gives the appellant a right of access to the Supreme Court of Canada. This 
means he needs no leave from that Court to appeal. Should the Supreme Court 
of Canada declare the section to amount to an excessive and unjustified 
limitation of rights, it has no authority to substitute anything for what it 
eliminates. However, since the B.C. Court of Appeal heard Ferguson's appeal, 
* R. v. Oakes, Volume 23, page 16 of this publication, 
or 24 C.C.C. (3d) 321 
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the Parliament of Canada adopted Bill C-15 . Thi s Bill received Royal Assent, 
but has not been proclaimed, and it is difficult to assess why it is held up . 
In any event, the Bill does amends . 146(1) C.C. by removing the offending 
words and substituting a reverse onus with a due diligence test. In respect 
to the knowledge of age, the Bill proposes to say that it is no defence to a 
char~e of statutory rape ... 
"that the accused believed that the 
complainant was fourteen years of age 
or more at the time the offence is 
alleged to have been committed unless 
the acc~~ec tcck ~11 reasonable steps 
to ascertain the age of the 
complainant." 
****** 
- 31 -
THE MEANING OF PROlJLING AND LOITERING 
Regina v. Willis - County Court of Vancouver Island -
Victoria, No. 40750-C, June 1987 
The accused and a companion were found "at nightn on private property near a 
dwelling house. They were concealing themselves, and the trial judge was of 
the view they did so as they had attempted to break into the house. Probably 
because the Crown was short of evidence to prove the latter, the twosome were 
charged with prowling by night. Willis appealed his conviction claiming that 
he was a mere trespasser, but not a prowler. 
The County Court Judge confirmed that a prowler is a trespasser, but that 
every trespasser is not a prowler. Then, what makes a trespasser a prowler or 
loiterer? There are not too many cases on these points, but one that always 
seems to be favoured is the decision by an Alberta Magistrate in 1970*. The 
Courts are quite consistent in defining the two verbs (to prowl - to loiter) , 
but the Alberta Magistrate had read more in Parliament's intent to prohibit 
such behaviour around a home during the night hours. He could not believe 
that stealthily roaming on a property, making every effort not to be detected 
(prowling) or just aimlessly "hanging around", not caring if detected 
(loitering), was all the Crown needed to prove to convict a person of the 
offence now found in s. 173 C.C. The Magistrate added that the prowling or 
loitering must be predatory in nature meaning that the person must be on the 
scrounge to steal, to break in or to invade the privacy of dwellers in sqme 
way. He found comfort for his views from the fact that a lawful excuse for 
prowling or loitering renders the prowler inunune. He said: 
"Therefore, unless the evidence 
satisfies a Court beyond a reasonable 
doubt that an accused person was 
hunting in a stealthy manner for an 
opportunity to carry out an unlawful 
purpose, I do not think he can be held 
to be prowling." 
The B.C. County Court Judge disagreed and held that it is not necessary for 
the Crown to prove that the prowler or loiterer is hunting to carry out an 
unlawful purpose. (If that was so "peeping" would not be included in s. 173 
C.C.). 
"In other words, if the Crown 
establishes the prowling (or the 
loitering as the case may be), an 
accused is then required to provide a 
lawful excuse, otherwise he is guilty 
as charged." 
* R. v. HcLean (1970) 1 C.C.C. (2d) 277 
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This being so, the County Court Judge considered hiding after attempting to 
break-in hardly a lawful excuse. 
Appeal Dismissed . 
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ADMISSIBILITY OF STATEMENT - CONFLICTING EVIDENCE -
CREDIBILITY INDUCEMENT - AWARENESS FOR WHAT PURPOSE STATEMENT 
KAY BE USED 
The Queen and Walsh - B.C. Court of Appeal -
Victoria C.A. No. V00403, June 1987 
The accused had been convicted of breaking and entering a home and committing 
an indictable offence therein. A kernel issue at trial was the admissibility 
of a statement the accused had made to the officer who had arrested him. The 
evidence given by the officer, and that of the accused during a voir dire were 
consistent except for the crucial parts. The officer attested that, upon 
arrest, the accused had been informed of his right to counsel and the right to 
remain silent, but that anything he would say might be used at his trial. 
This warning, and the information re: right to counsel where given at the 
scene of the arrest, and again at the police office before the disputed 
statement was taken. The accused had testified that at no time was he 
informed of any rights, but was only told that, "things would go better for 
him" if he made a statement. The trial judge had admitted the statement in 
evidence. The accused appealed the conviction arguing that his statement 
should not have been admitted. 
The trial judge had found that the" ... weight of the evidence in this matter 
favours ... the officer." Based on this finding, he had ruled the statement 
admissible, particularly as in every other aspect the versions of the officer 
and that of the accused, of all that happened was without conflict. 'What the 
trial judge had not indicated was that he believed the officer on the points 
in issue, and had rejected the accused's version of these matters. A trial 
judge has that prerogative, but must consider an issue involving credibility 
in criminal cases to be such that he can say to have no reasonable doubt as to 
the facts. Here, the reference made by the trial judge leads one to infer 
that he considered that, on the balance of probabilities, he believed the 
officer. His comment indicates that he was inclined to believe the officer 
over the accused. That does simply not meet the Crown's burden of proof in 
criminal law . 
Accused ' s appeal allowed 
New trial ordered. 
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IS EVIDENCE OF COMPl.AINT OF SEX OFFENCE ADMISSIBLE 
DESPITE TIIE ABROGATION OF •RECENT COKPl.AINT• 
Regina v. OWENS - 33 C.C . C. (3d) 275 
Ontario Court of Appeal 
A school teacher was accused of having sexually assaulted grade 2 children 
under his care. 'When these children testified the defence implied 
falsification and influence by the parents. To rebut these allegations the 
Crown adduced evidence of the complaints the children had lodged by telling 
their parents ot what the teacher natl done to them. 
Defence counsel had not objected at the time that evidence was adduced, but 
had raised the propriety of the use of the evidence when he appealed the 
accused's convictions for sexual assault. The trial judge had been very 
careful to explain the use and evidentiary value of the parents' testimony . 
The parents' evidence could not serve to prove the truth of the content of the 
statements the children had made to them, but only to show the children 
complained and that there was consistency between these statements and the 
children's tes timo-:iy. This al.s c .. f_a-,-.:: defence counsel an opportunity to assess 
that consistency, determine if there was recent fabrication, and to test if 
the parents had influenced the children. He (the trial judge) had not used 
the evidence from the parents to "bolster" the children's testimony. An 
inevitable consequence, of course, especially with a jury, is that such 
cons~stency assists to establish the children's (complainant's) credibility . 
The Ontario Court of Appeal held that the trial judge had been accurate on the 
law in this issue . Defence counsel seemingly argued that as he had not 
alleged that the children's evidence was fabricated, but had only wondered out 
loud, as it were, if the children had, under the parents' influence, 
fabricated their testimony, he had not opened the road for the Crown to cal l 
evidence of previous consistent statements. The Ontario Court of Appeal 
responded : 
"It is not necessary to show that an 
allegation of recent fabrication has 
been expressly made before prior 
consistent statements become 
admissible: The allegation may be 
implicit from the conduct of the 
case." 
Prior to the common law doctrine of recent complaints being abrogated (January 
4, 1983 - s . 246.5 C.C.), police investigators would, particularly in 
complaints of sex offenses, take statements from persons the victim had 
complained to. The defence used to reason many years ago, that if a woman was 
trespassed upon sexually, her indignation, hurt and trauma would cause her to 
complain to a confidant at the first reasonable opportunity. Such an 
unsolicited statement was admissible in evidence to show credibility on the 
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part of the complainant and consistency in her version of the events . If a 
female victim had not raised a "hue and cry", the defence could find support 
in its submission that then perhaps it did not happen, or happened differently 
from what she testified to. (Later, this doctrine was extended to any victim 
of crimes which are likely to cause hysteria on the part of the victim, such 
as kidnapping, unlawful confinement, etc... It should be noted that the 
recent complaint doctrine ought to still apply to the latter as the abrogation 
is only in regards to sex offenses). However, the abrogation of the rule has 
not affected the evidence provision applied in this case. It seems inevitable 
that the defence will imply in cross examination, or by their conduct of the 
case that the complainant's testimony is a fabrication. If that is done, then 
others may testify that the complainant's out-of-court statements are 
consistent with his/her testimony. It seems that taking statements, from 
those to whom the complaint was made, should not be abandoned. 
Accused's appeal dismissed . 
Convictions for sexual assaults 
upheld . 
Note: On "recent complaint" being an exception to the "oath help" rule , 
despite the abrogation, see also R v. GEORGE (1985) 23 C. C.C. (3d) 42 and R v. 
Page · (1984) 12 C.C.C. (3d) 250 . 
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THE MEANING OF SEXUAL ASSAULT 
Regina v. CHASE - Supreme Court of Canada 
October 1987 
The accused went uninvited into his neighbour's home when the fifteen year old 
girl, who resided there, was home alone with her much younger brother and a 
very elderly grandparent. The accused was quite aggressive in attempting to 
overcome the girl's resistance to him touching her genitals. He had grabbed 
her around the shoulders and had held her breasts. She had fought back and 
prevented the accused from searching her genitals. "My hands were too fast", 
testified the complainant. The accused had said: "Come on dear, don't hit 
me, I know you want it." When he left, due to someone having phoned another 
neighbour for assistance, the accused said he would tell everybody that the 
complainant had "raped" him. 
The New Brunswick Court of Appeal had reduced the accused's conviction to the 
lesser and included offence of common assault. This Court found that no 
assault is 'sexual' unJ.ess the genitalia were touched. The breasts have 
"secondary sexual cha:reictE:ri~tics", and if the touching of all parts of the 
anatomy, which may encompass sexual characteristics, were included in a broad 
definition of sexual assault, absurdities would result, held that Court. It 
implied that an assault with some sexual overtones is not necessarily a sexual 
assault. The Crown appealed . 
The Supreme Court of Canada observed that "assault" is defined by statute with 
a good measure of common law filling in all of the gaps, but "sexual" is not 
defined. This offence was included in the Criminal Code of Canada only a few 
years ago and this was the first time that the Supreme Court of Canada was 
specifically to answer the narrow question of law: "What is a sexual 
assault?" 
The Supreme Court of Canada held: 
1. that all subsections of s. 244 C. C., which defines assault, apply to 
sexual assault (an actual touching is not necessary) . 
2. that the test to determine if an assault is a sexual assault is an 
objective one (makes it a point of law), and 
3. that a "sexual assault is an assault ... which is committed in circumstances 
of a sexual nature, such that the sexual integrity of the victim is 
violated." 
Like several Courts of Appeal had already done, the Supreme Court of Canada 
totally rejected ~he views of the New Brunswick Court of Appeal. 
Crown's Appeal Allowed 
Conviction of sexual assault sub-
stituted for that of common assault. 
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UNFOUNDED JUDICIAL SCATHING OF POLICE 
AND CROWN; CONTROL OVER. AGENT IN 
UNDERCOVER OPERATION: ENTRAPMENT 
Regina v. Gudbranson - B.C. Court of Appeal 
CA 005837, Vancouver, October 1987 
In Volume 25 of this publication is a synopsis of the reasons for Judgement by 
a County Court Judge, who sat with a jury to try the accused for trafficking 
cocaine. He was very critical of police and Crown Counsel and concluded that 
they had been deceptive (in obstructing the defence from locating and calling 
the undercover agent police used) unfair and conducted themselves 
questionably. He held that this had deprived the accused of making a full 
answer and defence. This had justified him to stay the proceedings. The 
Crown appealed this decision. 
The trial judge had been critical that the police operation was set up in such 
a way that W., the civilian undercover operator, would not be involved in the 
transactions the Crown relied on to substantiate the charge. This would not 
make it essential for him to be a witness to prove the trafficking. All W 
did, according to him, was that he got the accused to sell cocaine to a police 
officer. According to the defence theory (not rejected by the trial judge) W 
had sold the cocaine to the accused so he, in turn, could sell to the officer . 
The sale to the accused was by a party only known as "Ken". Police had not 
been able to identify this Ken and W denied to know that person or to have 
arranged for anyone to supply the accused with cocaine. 
At the preliminary hearing, defence counsel gave notice to the Crown that W 
was required by the defence. This, it was later argued, was essential to show 
entrapment. If anyone had importuned and enticed the accused to provide the 
cocaine, it was W and not the police. This notice had not resulted in any 
action on the part of the police or the Crown to locate W who police claimed 
had disappeared for parts unknown. Crown Counsel was "censured" too, for not 
instructing police to locate W for the defence. It was the Crown's duty. said 
the trial judge, to know W's whereabouts at all times during the trial 
process. It was not until the trial judge had threatened to cure this impasse 
by means of a judicial stay of proceedings that the Crown and police produced 
W. 
It should be noted that W was an agent provocateur and not an informer. His 
identity could therefore not be protected and he was competent and compellable 
as a witness. 
Another interesting point is that the defence wanted Y to show entrapment and 
the trial judge had held that the failure to produce Y had deprived the 
accused at the preliminary hearing already, of making a full answer and 
defence. Entrapment is not a defence but an aspect of abuse of the process of 
the Court. A preliminary inquiry court is not a court of competent 
jurisdiction to grant a remedy under s. 24(1) of the Charter. ls it also 
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incompetent to determine entrapment and stay the proceedings of a preliminary 
inquiry? This interesting question was not answered by the B.C . Court of 
Appeal as the defence never raised the issue of entrapment at the preliminary 
hearing or involved the presiding Judge in its attempts to locate W. All 
defence counsel did was put the prosecutor on notice that he wanted W at the 
trial. 
The B.C. Court of Appeal decisively disagreed with the Trial Judge on nearly 
everything that had caused his sharp criticism of police and Crown. 
The Court of Appeal could not see where there was any basis for the trial 
ju~g~'s ccnclusi~n ~h~t t~~ p0lic~ had been deceptive and had misled the 
defence. If defence counsel had wanted W, he should have involved the judge 
and simply have applied for a subpoena. If the defence was relying on 
entrapment, W was the star witness. Not only had the defence to take the 
initiative to compel~. but also had to raise the issue of entrapment and 
sustain its existence . The Crown does not have to prove that there was no 
entrapment . 
Said the B.C. Court of Appeal : 
"I think the record before us is 
devoid of any evidence to support the 
apparent conclusion of Judge Hogarth 
that the Crown refused 'to make every 
reasonable effort by those means to 
find the witness' and that the Crown's 
failure was tantamount to obstructing 
justice." 
At the preliminary hearing there had been no deprivation of the accused ' s 
rights to make a full answer and defence, and in respect to that the "stay" 
was unjustified. 
The B.C. Court then examined whether there was any other 
for a judicial stay of proceedings. The trial judge had 
a number of events that lead up to the accused ' s arrest. 
found: 
justifiable reason 
been very critical of 
The trial judge had 
1. that the accused had, at the outset, not been a person who was likely to 
traffic in drugs; 
2. that W had been persistent that the accused sell drugs to the undercover 
constable; 
3. that police, although not responsible for W's tactics, were aware of the 
methods W used to put pressure on the accused to comply; 
4. that W himself was trading in drugs during this time, and that police had 
inadequately controlled or kept tabs on W to prevent these illegal 
activities; 
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5 . that the cocaine the accused had purchased to sell to the constable was 
probably W's property and police had made no effort to ensure that such 
would not be the case. 
It is of interest to note that the stay of proceedings the trial judge ordered 
was not for entrapment (he obviously found that there was not' sufficient 
evidence to. hold that this was a "clear case" of entrapment) but because W had 
not been produced at the preliminary hearing. He held this had deprived the 
accused of a full answer and defence. Secondly, he had held that it .. . 
" ... is a clear case of unfair and 
highly questionable conduct that, 
under the circumstances, is oppressive 
and thus an abuse of process." 
These two matters were sufficient grounds to enter a stay of proceedings the 
trial judge had held. 
The B.C. Court of Appeal found there was no evidence the police or Crown had 
been deceptive in any way. Defence counsel had not followed the proper 
procedure to compel W to appear . Neither had he met the burden of proof on 
the defence to show that a stay was justified. 
The Court of Appeal also wondered what made the trial judge believe that the 
Crown needs to know the whereabouts of witnesses it is not calling. 
Furthermore, the trial judge had placed too great a burden on police in an 
undercover operation. An agent "must have room for manoeuvre", said the 
Court. If W was trafficking in dugs, it was irrelevant to the allegations 
against the accused. At best, it could affect his credibility. Although 
evidence of W supplying and profiting from supplying the very narcotics which 
were subject to the charge against the accused might lead to the conclusion 
that there was entrapment, there was simply no evidence of this . The trial 
judge's findings in this regard had been no more than "supposition" and 
nothing more. 
Concluded the B.C.Court of Appeal unanimously: 
"On the whole , I am of the view there is 
no evidence to sustain the J udge's 
conclusion that this was a clear case of 
unfair and highly questionable conduct 
that under the circumstances was 
oppressive and constituted an abuse of 
the process. " 
Crown's Appeal allowed 
Stay or proceedings set aside 
New trial ordered . 
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LEGAL TID-JHTS 
DEMANDING 'ROADSIDE' BRF.ATH SAMPLES OF PERSON WO HAS BEEN DRIVING 
A pe.ace officer is empowered under s. 238 C. C. to demand a sample of breath 
from a person "who is driving a motor vehicle or who has the care and control 
of a motor-vehicle", if he suspects that that person has alcohol in his body . 
In this case, the accused took his conviction for refusing to supply such a 
breath sample upon demand to the Manitoba Court of Appeal, arguing that the 
circumstances in which he was found were not included in those which 
authorized the officer to make the demand . 
In compliance with the section, the allegation was that the accused had been 
driving when the demand was made of him while in fact the car had left the 
road after some erratic driving, and was parked somewhere in a field. The 
officer found the accused behind the wheel and .the demand was then made. 
Tht: defe:nce reasont::cl that due t0 the "is driving" the roadside demand must 
arise from a suspicion of the: suspect having alcohol in his body immediately 
upon cessation of driving. 
The question was whether the "is driving" includes the past tense (has been) 
provided the driving was recent ~hen the roadside demand is made . As an 
enactment must receive a liberal and broad interpretation to meet its object . 
(Interpretation Act) , the demand was justified and binding on the accused . 
His appeal was dismissed. 
Regina v. Johnson, 32 C.C . C.(3d) 126 
IMPROMPTU AND VOLUNTEERED.STATEMENT 
A police officer attended at a one-car accident. The accused walked up to the 
officer and, without being asked any questions, identified himself as the 
driver of the car. Consequently, there was a conviction of "over 80 mlg . ". 
The accused appealed this to the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal arguing that the 
statement ought not to have been admitted in evidence without a voir dire. 
The Court held that no voir dire is necessary if the statement made is not a 
response to a question. 
Regina v. Houlaison - 32 C.C . C. (3d) 188 
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UNREASONABLE SF.ARCH 
A police officer stopped the accused for reasons under the provincial traffic 
laws. He had a general conversation with her and asked what was under a cover 
on the back seat. As the accused gave her answer: "my clothing", the officer 
reached in and removed the cover. He found woman's clothing with price tags 
still attached. It was subsequently discovered that the clothing was stolen 
and a charge of possession of stolen goods was preferred. The Quebec Court of 
Appeal held that the search was unreasonable and that admitting the clothing 
into evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute. 
Acquittal was upheld. 
R. v. Vaughen , 33 C.C.C. (3d) 426 
TAKING BLOODSAKPLE - UNRF.ASONABLE SEARCH 
The accused was injured as the driver in a single car accident. While in 
hospital in an incoherent and delirious state, a physician took, without 
warrant, a sample of blood from the accused and turned it over to police . The 
sample was not required for medical purposes. Despite this unreasonable 
searth, the accused was convicted for "over 80 mlg." and the trial judge's 
verdict was upheld by the Manitoba Court of Appeal. The Supreme Court of 
Canada, however, disagreed. The search was unreasonable (the Crown conceded 
this), and admission of the evidence would bring the administration of justice 
into disrepute. 
POHOREISKY v. The Queen , 33 C.C . C. (3d) 398 
****** 
WORTIU.ESS CHF.QUES 
PRESUMPTION OF :KNOWLEDGE OF INSUFFICIENT FUNDS 
The accused received gasoline and cash on three occasions within a four day 
period. He was convicted of false pretences and challenged the convictions 
based on the well known presumption in s. 320(4) C.C. that if a cheque bounces 
it may be presumed the issuer knew it was worthless unless he has reasonable 
grounds to believe that there were sufficient funds on deposit to cover the 
cheque. The Alberta Queen ' s Bench held that the objective of the presumption 
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was unable to override the constitutional protection the presumption of 
innocence provide. In other words, the presumption was not demonstrably 
justified in our free and democratic society. Secondly, the presumption falls 
short of the "rationality test", that is, that there must be a rational 
connection between the proven fact and the presumed fact (the proven fact must 
make the presumed fact nearly a probability). Thirdly, the wording of s. 
320(4) C.C. removes all judicial discretion in that it states that knowledge 
"shall" be presumed. Fourthly, the merchants took a business risk that should 
not be decreased by means of criminal law. "Having found that this section 
does not survive the rational connection test, it follows that the 
infringement ins. ll(d) cannot be saved by s.1 of the Charter." Short of 
saying that s. 320(4) C.C. is without force or effect, the Justice set aside 
the convictions. 
Regina v. DRISCOLL - 34 C. C.C. (3d) 283 
January 1987 
Not.e: This ruling l!:> IJOi.. b im~~i!f 01 1 B. C. Courts 
* * * * * * * 
CONSTITUTIONAL VALIDITY OF IDENTIFICATION OF ~ ACT 
PROPRIETY OF FINGERPRINTING PRIOR TO CONVICTION 
The two accused were each compelled to attend at the police station for 
photographing and fingerprinting. The one was so ordered by means of an 
appearance notice; the other by summons. The charges against these persons 
are unrelated to one another. Both refused to appear and challenged the 
validity of the Identification of Criminals Act. This dispute ended up in the 
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal. This court concluded that it was against the 
liberty and security of the person (s.7 Charter) to be mugged and printed 
prior to conviction. The challenged Act provides for this degrading 
experience prematurely and creates a selective fingerprinting. The Court held 
that, unless the persons were convicted, they were not required to attend as 
ordered. 
Regina v. HIGGINS and Regina v. BEARE 
34 c.c.c. (3d) 193 
See case note, bottom of page 11. 
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Note: On December 17 , the Supreme Court of Canada reversed this decision 
after a reported 15 minute deliberation by all nine justices . Reasons for 
judgement will be given on a later date . 
****** 
SF.ARCHING llITIIOUT VARRANT UNDER. N. C. ACT 
REENTER.ING TO INSTALL VIDEO F.OUII'MENT - RF.ASONABLENESS 
Police received information that narcotics were stored in a garage. They 
searched without warrant under s. 10 N.C. Act and found as they were informed. 
They returned and installed video equipment. The accused was recorded as the 
person who was handling the narcotics. The trial judge had admitted the video 
evidence. The Quebec Court of Appeal held that the original search may well 
have been reasonable, but the planting of the video equipment was a breach of 
s. 8 of the Charter (reasonable search). As the trial judge had erroneously 
ruled that s. 8 of the Charter did not apply as the garage was used for 
criminal purposes, he had given inadequate consideration to the admissibility 
of the taped evidence. A new trial was ordered. 
Regina v. ASENCIOS - 34 C.C.C. (3D) 168 
****** 
VIDEO EQUIPMENT USED TO GATHER GAMBLING EVIDENCE 
NO WARRANT - REASONABLESS OF SEARCH 
The accused rented a hotel suite for gambling purposes. Police received 
information of this, as well as information that the room was to be the scene 
of a robbery by persons not in any way related to the organizers. With the 
full knowledge and cooperation of the hotel management, surveillance of the 
room was maintained and it revealed evidence that the information regarding 
the gambling was correct. With the assistance of the hotel, video equipment 
was installed in the room without any sound equipment attached. An abundance 
of evidence was gained and after three nights of taping police walked in, 
arrested the principals and seized all kinds of evidence. No authorization or 
warrants were involved at any time. The . trial Judge rejected all of the 
evidence and the Crown appealed the accused's acquittals. The Ontario Court 
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of Appeal held that video taping is a search and a key consideration was 
whether the persons observed, by means of the camera, had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy. No authorization for intercepting private 
communication could have been issued as none were, or were intended to be 
recorded. In the circumstances, s. 8 of the Charter does not apply since 
there was no reasonable expectation of privacy as there were numerous 
invitations sent out to join the gambling group of about 35 people . 
Consequently, the video evidence should have been admitted as should the 
evidence seized upon the arrests. No warrant was needed to enter the room 
where police had reasonable and probably grounds that an indictable offence 
was being committed . Crown's appeal allowed and a new trial ordered. 
Regina v. WONG et al - Ontario Court of Appeal 
34 c.c.c. (3d) 51 
****** 
REASONABLE SE!LJ:!.CH - PROTECTION OF INFORMER 
The common law and the Supreme Court of Canada have made it clear in the 
strongest of terms that the iden:ity of a police informer (not agent) must not 
be disclosed. Since the Charter, defence counsel have made inroads into this 
dictum. In this case, it was submitted the information that provided the 
prerequisite grounds for the search was needed to make a full answer and 
defence to what was alleged . This includes the testing of the search and 
seizure against s. 8 of the Charter which grants a right to be secure against 
unreasonable search and seizure. Hence, when for that purpose the information 
(application) of the warrant is requested or required, the identity of an 
informer may become known. This creates a self-explanatory judicial dilemma . 
In this case, the Crown appealed the accused's acquittal on possession of 
narcotics for the purpose of trafficking. The narcotics were found in the 
accused's penthouse which was searched with a warrant obtained on the basis of 
information from a reliable informer. No editing of the sworn information 
would prevent disclosure of the identity of the informer. The Ontario Court 
of Appeal held that the informers must continue to be protected; however, in 
view of the Charter being supreme law, if the identity is revealed even by 
editing the information the Crown has an option not to proceed, seek consent 
of the informer to reveal his identity or proceed on the basis of a 
warrantless search. Crown's appeal allowed and a new trial ordered . 
Regina v. HUN'IER - 34 C.C.C.(3d) 14 
* * * * * * 
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•FRAUDUI.ENTLY• TELLING FORTUNE 
For $15, the accused told a police officer his fortune and future. She was 
convicted under s. 323(b) C.C. and appealed until she ended up in the Supreme 
Court of Canada. She claimed that since childhood she enjoyed special powers 
to predict the future; consequently, her fortune telling was not fraudulent. 
The Supreme Court of Canada held that as "The accused knows full well that she 
has no basis for her claim to be able to predict what will happen in people's 
future", the defence of belief is not open on the facts of the case . 
Accused's appeal was dismissed . 
33 C.C . C. (3d) 220 - LABRDSE v. The Queen 
* * * * * * 
OFFICER MISREPRESENTING HIMSELF AND THEREBY GAINING 
ACCESS TO ACCUSED HOKE WHERE EVIDENCE VAS DISCOVERED 
A Wildlife officer answered an advertisement offering meat for sale. He did 
not identify himself and pretended to have a personal interest to purchase 
some meat. He was invited in the home and he discovered that the meat was 
wildlife. Charges under Wildlife Act resulted. The trial Judge, however, 
reasoned that the officer had entered the home for the purpose of search and 
seizure. The deception, and the fact that the search was warrantless, 
rendered it unreasonable and the evidence was excluded. The Saskatchewan 
Court of Appeal upheld this view and observed that when it comes to a man's 
home, his castle, the authorities must announce their presence and demonstrate 
their authority by stating their lawful reason for entering. This was not 
done. The test whether the officer was such an authority is obviously an 
objective one. Crown's appeal was disallowed and acquittal was upheld. 
Regina v. RAHFORD - 32 c. c . c. (3d) 221 
****** 
SECURITY SEARCH OF UNARRESTED SUSPECT 
The accused was stopped for speeding and symptoms of impairment were detected 
when the officer spoke to him. A request was made of the accused to accompany 
the officer to the police car to give a sample of his breath in the roadside 
screening device. Without asking for permission to do so, the officer 
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searched the accused for "security reasons" before he allowed him to enter the 
police car . He had explained the purpose of the search to the accused. A 
quantity of marijuana was found on the accused, but the evidence was excluded 
at his trial for possession of a narcotic as the search and seizure had been 
unreasonable. This ruling was upheld by the Manitoba Court of Appeal. Said 
the Court: "~'hile at common law there exists power to search a person as 
inc~dent to an arrest, a search, apart from statutory authority, cannot 
precede an arrest and serve as part of the justification". Had the officers 
grounds for believing that his safety was in danger he should have effected an 
arrest and then he could have searched the accused. It was the intrusiveness 
of the search that had some bearing on the Court's finding. If a weapon is 
wh~t the officer was concerned about a npat down" search would have sufficed. 
Also, the officer could have asked for permission. However, he had searched 
as though he had a right to do so. That was an unreasonable intrusion in the 
circumstances. Crown's Appeal was dismissed . 
Regina v . HATHE - Manitoba Court of Appeal -
32 c.c.c . (3d) 272 
* * * * * * 
ROUTINE STOPPING OF CAR - ARBITRARY DETENTION 
Accused was stopped for no specific reason and he was asked to produce his 
driver's licence. He couldn't do so as the licence was suspended. The 
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal (in a 2 to l decision) found that the stop had 
constituted arbitrary detention contrary to the Charter . Consequently, the 
evidence of driving was inadmissible. Accused ' s conviction was quashed and 
acquittal was entered. 
Regina v. IRDN - 33 C. C.C. ( 3d) 157 
****** 
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CARE OR CONTROL OF A ROAT OUT OF GASOLINE 
The accused was adrift and signalled another boat passing by. As he was out 
of gas he was towed into shore. Police attended and concluded the accused was 
impaired. He refused to give any breath samples and was convicted of impaired 
boating and refusing to blow. He appealed, arguing that since he was out of 
gas, he was not likely to do anything with the controls of the boat that would 
set it in motion.* The County Court Judge disagreed, and held that the 
accused had the care or control. He was to keep a steady lookout, and use the 
oars to direct the boat as it drifted. 
Appeal dismissed 
Convictions upheld 
Regina v. TROSELL - County Coert of Vancouver 
cc 861796 
*See R. v. ToeFlls - Volume 22 , page 24 of this publication. 



